University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-1977

Government and Education: The University as a Regulated
Industry
Ernest Gellhorn
Barry B. Boyer
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Education Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ernest Gellhorn & Barry B. Boyer, Government and Education: The University as a Regulated Industry, 1977
Ariz. St. L.J. 569 (1977).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/762

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Government and Education:
The University as a
Regulated Industry*
Ernest Gellhorn**
Barry B. Boyer***
Government regulationis an expanding influence in modern education, particularly in university administration. This essay takes a
broadlook at the influence of government in education, explores the
basisfor most government regulation,and suggests some steps which
might be taken to assure that the concerns of higher education are
heardin the regulatoryprocessso that intervention will serve the goals
of government as well as the interest of the university.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Three years have passed since the presidents of two of the nation's most
prestigious universities scathingly criticized the federal government's role in
higher education. Addressing a distinguished group of lawyers, then-President
Kingman Brewster of Yale complained: "High on the agenda of the [legal]
profession, especially its scholarly branch, should be to see that in terms of
both limits on authority and redress against its abuse, the coercive power of the
federal purse [over higher education] is made subject to a rule of law."'
Harvard President Bok's attack included no less strident a warning. He alerted
Harvard's powerful alumni that for them "the critical issue for the next
generation is Harvard's independence and freedom from governmental re* This article is based on a speech delivered at the conference on "Horizon Issues in Government Regulation of Higher Education," held at the State University of New York at Buffalo
on April 21-22, 1977. A version of this article has been published previously in GOVERNMENT
REGULATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (W. Hobbs ed. 1978). The authors gratefully acknowledge
the permission of the publisher, Ballinger Publishing Company, to print this adaptation.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1962, University of
Minnesota.
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, SUNY/Buffalo.
A.B. 1966, Duke University; J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.
1. YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, April 1975, at 34-35.
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straint." 2 These attacks are symptomatic of general dissatisfaction with increasing government regulation of university action.
This essay considers the "stifling bureaucratic requirements" which President Bok argued impose increasing costs on universities without providing
corresponding benefits to either students or the public. Our concern is not
directly with the questions of whether government regulation is effective in
achieving its stated goals, or whether particular regulatory programs affecting
higher education embody sound public policies. 3 Rather, we will identify the
procedural constraints that are associated with greater federal regulation of
higher education and make a preliminary determination of whether these
restraints are as unreasonably burdensome as critics have suggested. 4
Although procedures are only one device for implementing the broad social
policies embodied in regulatory statutes, to a large degree the quality of the
administrative process will determine the practical effectiveness of a regulatory
program. Criticism of the regulation of higher education has not, of course,
been limited to the details of the regulatory process such as the draftsmanship
of rules or the quality of administration. Rather, the challenge goes deeper; it is
aimed directly at the legitimacy of government intervention in higher education
and must ultimately be assessed on that basis. 5
An important distinction between these two types of criticism needs to be
noted. Mistakes have clearly been made in implementing the recent regulatory
programs, and others will undoubtedly occur in the future. Indeed, it may well
be that there exists a disturbingly high degree of inadequate, inefficient, and
ineffective regulation in the programs affecting higher education. But unlike
2. Harvard U. Gazette, June 13, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
3. One evaluation has already been made of the constitutional basis of Brewster's challenge. In
1975, Robert O'Neil, now Vice President responsible for the Bloomington campus of Indiana
University, examined four areas where the constitutionality of encroachment by federal
regulation might be tested. The focus of these areas was on conditions imposed upon receipt
of federal funds. They included challenges to the federal government's imposition of conditions unrelated to the funded programs, attempts to accomplish indirectly that which the
federal government could not do directly, pressure on educational institutions to violate
individual constitutional rights, and invasions of the autonomy of educational institutions.
After examining the arguments and the evidence, however, O'Neil concluded that Brewster's
constitutional challenge was unfounded. O'Neil, God andGovernment at Yale: The Limits of
Federal Regulation of Higher Education, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 525 (1975).
4. Criticism and dissatisfaction with the performance of government as a regulator clearly have
not been limited to the field of higher education. See, e.g., Colloquium: The Deregulation of
Industry, 51 IND. L.J. 682 (1976); Demsetz, Economics as a Guide to Antitrust Regulation, 19
J. LAW & ECON. 371 (1976); Why Regulate Utilities?, II J. LAW & ECON. 55 (1968); Posner,
Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 567 (1977); Schmults, Evaluation of Overall Benefits and Shortcomings of Federal Regulation, 32 Bus. LAW. 869 (Special Issue, March 1977); Werther,
Government Control v. Corporate Ingenuity, 26 LABOR L.J. 360 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Oaks, A Private University Looks at Government Regulation, 4 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1976).
But see Jenkins, Regulation of Colleges and Universities Under the Guaranteed Student Loan
Program, 4 J.C. & U.L. 13 (1976).
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the criticism aimed generally at the role of government in education, the attack
on inefficiency alone would not necessarily make the case against such regulations; the costs of new procedures must ultimately be weighed against the
benefits that can be realized from the regulatory programs and the probability
6
that the regulatory system will improve.
Today's colleges and universities are no longer (if they ever were) isolated
institutions standing apart from the main currents of society. Indeed, the
universities have become a major force for social change, often supplying both
the intellectual blueprint for government action and the personnel to implement
it. Government recognition of the importance of education has supported the
massive infusion of federal aid in the post-Sputnik era. The "Brain Trusts" of
the Roosevelt Administration, the "Best and the Brightest" of the Kennedy
era, the civil rights and anti-poverty programs, and the movement to end the
war in Vietnam drew heavily on academic support.
Beyond its direct involvement in the formation and implementation of public
policies, the contemporary university wields several other kinds of social
power. A large university can dominate the economic life of the surrounding
community in its double role as a major consumer of goods and services and as
an employer. In the aggregate, institutions of higher learning comprise a
significant sector of the national economy. Moreover, they increasingly control
individual access to economic goods. In a specialized technological society,
the universities assume the role of gate-keepers, controlling access to employment opportunities, and thus to wealth, power, and influence. Thus it is hardly
surprising that society would think it desirable, if not essential, to assure that
7
higher education is accountable and responsive to public needs.
We concur with this view and believe that the theoretical and practical
justifications for government regulation of higher education are firmly estab6. It should also be borne in mind that the "benefits" of government regulation cannot be
evaluated strictly in terms of a quidpro quo: the receipt of government funds in exchange for
expenditures in compliance with government regulations. The successes -of regulatory programs in achieving societal goals, such as the elimination of discrimination and the securing of
personal privacy, are also "benefits" which are largely consistent with the goals of a university.
7. Some commentators see a measure of poetic justice in the application to higher education of
regulatory programs and techniques that were originally designed or advocated by academicians. Former Solicitor General Robert Bork has espoused this view:
"The academic world has been actively hostile to the claims of other non-governmental institutions to autonomy in the name of greater efficiency that benefits society,"
he said.
"The result is not only that many today take pleasure in the plight of academics
forced to swallow their own medicine, but also the public philosophy of dispersed
authority has been undermined and ridiculed by intellectuals who now invoke it for
their own benefit.
"It should not come as a surprise if that invocation is met with a smile."
Quoted in Winkler, Government Rulemaking: Any Hope for Simplification?, Chronicle of
Higher Education, Dec. 20, 1976, at 5, col. 5.
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lished and likely to endure. Universities are too important a force in society to
escape the contemporary demands for fairness, openness, equality of opportunity, and accountability that are being pressed upon all large and powerful
institutions. And the processes and techniques of administrative regulation,
imperfect as they are, may well be the most practicable means of meeting these
demands.
If the goals of regulation seem worthy, why then have educators so frequently reacted with hostility and alarm to the imposition of new regulatory
requirements? Three factors may account for the negative responses. First, a
large part of the opposition seems to arise from the inevitable frictions that are
created when substantial; rapid changes are imposed on large organizations.
Change is especially disquieting when it is implemented by an unfamiliar
bureaucracy which is not always cognizant of the special needs, values, and
problems of higher education. Moreover, the kinds of procedural changes with
which we are here concerned-open decisionmaking, widespread participatory
rights, more reasoned and explained decisions, and the development of ongoing relationships with external regulators-alter distributions of power within
the university. They also modify perceptions and expectations of change. It
should not be surprising, therefore, that members of the university community
may feel a real threat to the security of their position.
Another major factor in academia's resistance to government regulation is
the "cost squeeze." Complying with regulatory requirements can impose
major expenses on the universities, and the current wave of federal regulation
has come at a time when most institutions of higher learning are facing the
painful dilemma posed by austere budgets, declining enrollments, and sharply
rising costs. At the same time, the social benefits to be realized through some
regulatory programs may seem trivial or nonexistent by the time program goals
have been translated from the broad generalities of statutory policy to the
8
operational realities of administrative regulations.
Finally, some part of the resistance to government regulation may be
directed at the less tangible, more symbolic aspects of the regulatory process.
That the political institutions of society have felt it necessary to impose a
system of regulation on the universities implies a judgment that higher education cannot be trusted to serve the public interest on its own initiative. Given
the extraordinary record of abuses of public trust by powerful institutions
inside and outside government during the past decade, it is understandable that
8. Few educators, for example, would oppose the principle that sex discrimination in higher
education should be eliminated. Yet many have questioned the wisdom of pressing this
general principle to the particular conclusion that expenditures on intercollegiate athletics
should be equalized between the sexes.
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the public's view of institutional power is heavily colored with skepticism and
suspicion. The large amounts of public money flowing into higher education
probably would have brought a demand for greater controls on the use of those
funds in any event. Still, the academic community reacts with surprise and
resentment to this questioning of its integrity. 9
In some respects, the concerns are well-founded; but despite these kinds of
problems, the overall picture of the emerging regulatory environment is by no
means as bleak as the critics have painted it. Higher education is still in the
early stages of adjustment to broad federal regulation, and first attempts
seldom produce perfect accommodations. The administrative process provides
a variety of tools that can be used to affect the necessary adjustments to
regulation.' 0 If the leadership of higher education continues to develop the
understanding and the skill to use these tools effectively, many of the rough
edges of the regulatory process can be smoothed.
By increasing the accountability of the universities, administrative procedures can help higher education to maintain the confidence of its constituencies
and of the general public. More importantly, the procedures and techniques of
the administrative process can improve the way major decisions are made and
implemented within the universities. The underlying process values of administrative procedures--openness, rationality, fairness, efficiency, and accountability-are not inconsistent with the goals of the university.
Positive benefits can also flow from higher education's involvement in the
regulatory process, beyond the crucial financial support government is providing. Regulatory programs are designed to implement policies of broad importance to the society, policies such as equality of opportunity, fairness to
workers and students, or occupational safety, which ought to guide the actions
of the universities. When regulatory procedures are well-designed and properly
used, they can make it possible to achieve these policy goals.
9. Many academicians are also quite sensitive, perhaps more so than the general public, to the
"red tape" image of bureaucracy, with its interminable delays, rigid rules, and stultifying
uniformity. In part, this response may reflect a general temperamental characteristic of those
who have chosen the academic life; in part, it may arise from the belief that bureaucracy tends

to respond only to gross, quantifiable, demonstrably utilitarian "inputs" and "outputs" and
therefore may be indifferent or hostile to important academic values.

10. There is, of course, no single "administrative process" but rather a variegated set of principles and decisionmaking systems which characterize that part of government that is neither
purely legislative nor purely judicial. See generally G. ROBINSON & E. GELLHORN, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 18-25 (1974); Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative
Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975). We believe that there are a sufficient number of shared

policies and patterns of interaction-both wholly within the university and within the context
of dealings between the university and outside agencies-to warrant generalizations about
how administrative law is changing the institutions of higher education. For a thoughtful
discussion of the shifting perspectives toward the administrative process, see Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw.
U.L. REV. 120 (1977).
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CONTROLLING DISCRETION WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY

Only in recent years have questions been raised about limiting the discretion
of university administrators. In the relatively recent past, university administrations were seldom questioned in the governance of their institutions. I I
Trustees and regents quietly affirmed policy choices; their offices were positions of honor and prestige, not power bases for policymaking. University
presidents and provosts declared policy, and consultations with those affected
were usually held only after basic decisions had been made and sometimes
even implemented. The appointment, promotion, and tenure of faculties were
determined by department chairmen and college deans with little guidance,
much less interference, from other faculty members or the affected individuals.
Curricular decisions were made by faculties, it is true, but without serious
student input and with little change over time. Admissions decisions were
highly discretionary. Student conduct was subject to rules drafted by universities in their roles as surrogate parents,' 2 and while their subjects did not
always applaud the rules, they did not seriously challenge either their propriety
or their application. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, no one had a right to a
university education or to be a teacher, and therefore university students and
teachers had no rights.' 3 If dissatisfied with the rules or their application, one
could choose another institution or field; no forum was available to raise
questions or to obtain redress.
Today, by contrast, courts have set substantial limits on the authority and
discretion of university administrators. One of the most basic and perhaps farreaching changes which has occurred within higher education is the set of
limitations now placed on educator choice. That is, decisional standards must
frequently be spelled out and fair procedures for applying these standards must
be developed and stated.' 4 These requirements are important to students,
11.

See, e.g., De Haan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626, 627 (D. Mass. 1957) (no hearing
required in dismissal of a student, the court observing that it "isin a poor position indeed to
substitute its judgment for that of the university"). See generally D. HORNBY, HIGHER
EDUCATION ADMISSION LAW SERVICE
L. REV. 1027 (1969).

12.

(1973); Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22

VAND.

See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924) ("courts
have no more authority to interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a
father in his family"); Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913)
("College authorities stand in loco parentis concerningthe physical and moral welfare and
mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end, they may not make
any rule or regulation for the government or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for
the same purpose. . . .[Tlhe courts are not disposed to interfere.").

13. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) (no right to be a
student in a state university free from military training required by state; "California has not
drafted or called them to attend the university.").
14. Little attention has yet been paid to the process relied upon by universities in drawing such
standards and procedures. If the federal experience in agency rulemaking is instructive, that
too will become a focus of interest and searching scrutiny. See generally Clagett, Informal
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teachers, and educational institutions, as well as the public generally. The
rationales for these new controls on discretion in higher education are often not
considered or fully appreciated by the people they affect. In most instances
they have been initiated by courts rather than the executive or legislative
branches of government. 15
A.

Judicial Controls16

The earliest and most basic changes in the discretion allowed university
administrators came not because of federal funding or executive interference
through regulations and procedures. They occurred because courts found that
educational institutions had overstepped reasonable bounds in regulating student conduct both substantively (i.e., what was actually decided) and procedurally (i.e., how the decision was made). ' 7 The Supreme Court's decision
in Healy v. James 18 is illustrative and instructive of judicially imposed limitations on university administrators' authority. The controversy involved a state
college's denial of recognition (and use of its facilities) to a local chapter of the
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). The Supreme Court held that the
students' first amendment right of association prevented the college from
refusing recognition to the SDS chapter because of the organization's unconventional views. The students' success was not total, however. In recognizing
student rights and limiting educator discretion, the Court did not entirely
displace the state college's discretion, but carefully confined it within specific
boundaries,' 9 thereby protecting academic and political freedom from encroachment by the college.
Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative
Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and AdministrativeProcedureReform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485
(1970); Note, The JudicialRole in Defining ProceduralRequirementsfor Agency Rulemaking,
87 HARV. L. REV. 782 (1974).

15.

16.
17.

18.
19.

Many of the new controls reflect changing attitudes toward authority. See, e.g., Soglin v.
Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968) ("The facts of life have long since
undermined the concepts, such as in loco parentis, which have been invoked historically for
conferring upon university authorities virtually limitless disciplinary discretion."), aff'd, 418
F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
See generally Gellhorn & Hornby, ConstitutionalLimitations on Admissions Proceduresand
Standards-Beyond Affirmative Action, 60 VA. L. REV. 975, 979-98 (1974).
See generally Habecker, Students, Christian Colleges, and the Law: And the Walls Come
Tumbling Down, 2 J.C. & U.L. 369, 379 (1975): "[Given the in loco parentis doctrine], private
colleges, as well as state universities proceeded to travel a road paved with unbridled
arrogance, and students began and continued, as the case may have been, to be treated with
increased indifference. Formal proceedings were almost unheard of .
408 U.S. 169 (1972).
The traditional first amendment standard requiring a clear and present danger before speech
could be inhibited was qualified as applied to a university. Reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations could be imposed upon students by the college administration. It therefore
followed that the college could deny recognition to an organization only if it refused to obey
reasonable rules for maintaining order. 408 U.S. at 191-94. See also Papish v. Curators of the

576
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Discretion with regard to student discipline, on the other hand, has been
restricted not by substantive constitutional rights such as freedom of speech,
but by procedural rights of due process. Though reluctant at first, courts have
become increasingly willing to oversee the process by which students are
disciplined. In the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State Boardof Education,20 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that notice and a hearing
were prerequisites to the expulsion of college students for misconduct. Students, the court ruled, must be given a statement of the specific charges and the
grounds which justify expulsion, as well as the names of opposing witnesses, a
report on the facts to which they testified, a full opportunity to present their
21
defense, and access to the findings and conclusions of the governing board.
Despite these requirements, a complete trial-type hearing with lawyers present,
subpoena powers, and the like has generally not been required. 22 In approving
a less stringent process for the suspension of high school students, the Supreme
Court in Goss v. Lopez 23 has made clear its basic agreement with the Dixon
result. In recognizing basic notions of fairness and fair process, the courts are
also aware that trial-type procedures are not the only alternative. Negotiating
processes which reflect concerns for accuracy and integrity in the decisionmak24
ing process, for example, may be acceptable alternatives.
Colleges and universities make a variety of judgments, some procedural and
others substantive, some disciplinary and others academic. Still others involve
employment and resource allocations. The extent to which courts will impose

20.
21.

22.

23.
24.

Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) ("[D]issemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to
good taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency.'
For a discussion of substantive constitutional limitations on decisionmaking by university
officials, see Hollister, A View of Some FirstAmendment Rights of College Students, 2 J.L. &
EDUC. 637 (1973).
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
Id. at 158-59. Accord Perlman v. Shasta Joint Junior College Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 9 Cal.
App. 3d 873, 879, 88 Cal. Rptr. 563, 567 (1970). See also General Order and Memorandum on
Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in'Review of Student Discipline in Tax
Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Esteban v.
Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969) (procedural due process for
suspension determination requires adequate notice, definite charge, and a hearing with an
opportunity to present one's own side), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
See General Order and Memorandum on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in
Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, supra note
21, at 147-48; Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 629 (W.D. Mo. 1968)
(The court will not "impose upon the academic community in student discipline the intricate,
time consuming, sophisticated procedures, rules and safeguards of law [which] would frustrate the teaching process and render the institutional control impotent."), aff'd, 415 F.2d
1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
See generally Antionore v. State, 49 App. Div. 2d 6, 371 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975) (negotiated
grievance procedure instead of state givil procedure system which accorded employee more
procedural protection did not violate constitutional due process); Baird & McArthur,
ConstitutionalDue Process and the Negotiation of Grievance Proceduresin Public Employment, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 209 (1976).
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their judgment to protect interests adversely affected by school decisions
depends largely on the type of judgment involved and the type of interest
affected. Cases like Healy and Dixon suggest that if decisions involve the
resolution of factual controversies or conflicting rights recognized at lawdecisions which courts typically make and on which educators have no special
competence-judicial examination of university processes can be close and
exacting. However, judicial concern for educator control of the academic
environment has affected the court's choice of required safeguards. Moreover,
only where basic constitutional rights are implicated have courts gone beyond a
review of educational procedures and substituted their judgment for the educators' about the propriety of the standard being applied.
The active judicial scrutiny to which free speech issues and disciplinary
procedures have been subjected has not been applied to review of either
academic judgments or a university's allocation of resources. 25 In the case of
academic judgments, the courts have demonstrated significant reluctance even
to enter this arena. 26 The reasons are obvious. Given the volume of academic
judgments made by every institution of higher education, university work
could be halted if procedural guarantees such as notice and hearing were
imposed every time a student was unhappy with a grade. Individual academic
judgments are admittedly subjective and have long been considered part of the
faculty's academic freedom. There is no available referent by which an outside
25.

See ACLU v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970): "College officials
properly have wide discretion in operating the school and in determining what actions are
most compatible with its educational objectives. . . . This court has no desire to interfere
with the operations of any school or to give encouragement to the trend of increasing
challenges to the considered decisions of university administrators."
26. Thus, in Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978), the Supreme Court recently
refused to upset a medical school's decision to dismiss a student for academic reasons, even
though serious questions had been raised concerning the school's consideration of the stu.dent's grooming habits in reaching its decision. See also, Cussler v. University of Md., 430 F.
Supp. 602, 605-06 (D. Md. 1977) (promotion decisions in academia involve matters of professional judgment with courts thus reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of academics
who are experts in their particular fields); Keys v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 939-40 (S.D.
Tex. 1973) ("The assignment of grades to a particular examination must be left to the
instructor. He should be given the unfettered opportunity to assess a student's performance
and determine if it attains a standard of scholarship required by that professor for a satisfactory grade. The federal judiciary should not adjudicate the soundness of a professor's grading
system, nor make a factual determination of the fairness of the individual grades. Such an
inquiry would necessarily entail the complete substitution of a court evaluation of a complainant's level of achievement in the subject under review, and the standard by which such
achievement should be measured for that of the professor. It would be difficult to prove by
reason, logic or common sense that the federal judiciary is either competent, or more
competent, to make such an assessment."); Lewis v. Chicago State College, 299 F. Supp.
1357, 1359 (N.D. III. 1969) ("The judiciary is not the appropriate forum for decisions involved
in academic rank."); Horne v. Cox, 551 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. 1977) (law student not entitled
to "contested case" hearing on grade he received on a research paper as "[t]here are no
constitutional or statutory provisions granting any legal rights or privileges to students in the
educational institutions of this state with respect to grades for academic performance.").
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court or agency could review academic determinations. Indeed, it may be
almost impossible to construct procedural reforms that would not occasion
second-guessing and gross invasion of the teacher's prerogatives. The resulting
deference given academic questions, even on procedural grounds, is almost
unlimited. 27 When it comes to reviewing resource allocation decisions, even
greater administrative discretion has been preserved. Applying the traditional
administrative law doctrine that administrative judgments on resource allocations are generally beyond judicial review, the Supreme Court has declared
28
such questions essentially beyond its control.
B.

Administrative Controls

The announcement and occasional enforcement of judicial controls is only a
first step. As the aftermath of Brown v. Boardof Education29 illustrates, when
important social policies are at stake, other social forces (here, the civil rights
movement) may have to develop before court orders have widespread impact
upon institutional behavior. In higher education, the due process "revolution"
has not been solely a product of judicial decisions. More frequently, procedural
changes have come about through the establishment of internal controls on
discretion by governing boards and administrators. The adoption of procedures
designed to assure a fair process has forced numerous changes, but most have
been concentrated in two areas. First, universities generally now have established procedures governing student expulsions for misconduct (as well as
other areas) which assure that the affected student receives a "fair hearing"
before an adverse decision is made. Second, these institutions have also written
codes or adopted standards which are applied in these hearings. Without such
standards, the results could be arbitrary and unreasonable. Under these
guidelines, if applied in a fair process, the results should be uniform and
rational.
Following sound legal advice and intelligent policy, most institutions have
not stopped at the edge of minimal legality. Their rules intentionally provide
additional safeguards. They have sought to err on the side of additional
procedures and standards, even where unconfined administrative discretion
might be upheld. Moreover, and perhaps as a result of these efforts, there has
been a change in attitudes and mores. The broad administrative authority which
was once considered absolutely necessary to assure educational autonomy and
27. And even the erosion of that deference now occurring at the elementary school level, where
occasional opportunities are available to question classification decisions, is seemingly limited
to two minimal procedural requirements-namely, uniformity of application and fair administration of the regulations.
28. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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administrative efficiency is now acknowledged to have been overstated. The
advantages of shared authority, with the possibility of greater responsiveness
and responsibility by students and faculty, have resulted in substantial extensions of once radical ideas. The universities have rediscovered an age-old truth
of law-namely, that the development of fair procedures need not impair
efficiency and that it may in fact contribute to the integrity of institutional
decisionmaking.
The elements of a fair procedure in a disciplinary proceeding, as they have
been worked out in the courts and through experience in the universities 30 and
colleges, are now well-established. Four basic features are commonly included: 3' (1) Notice of the charges must be given to the person being charged.
Knowing the charges is the first step in preparing to meet them; energy and
resources will not be spent (by either side) on irrelevant matters. A notice
requirement also establishes what charges the university must sustain. (2) A
hearing must be held where the charged person can hear and challenge the
evidence presented against him, as well as present affirmative evidence in his
own behalf. Evidence not presented in the hearing cannot be relied upon since
that would defeat the essence of a fair hearing, the opportunity to challenge and
rebut opposing evidence. Hearing procedures must be designed to assure that
the tribunal will have all the evidence before it which it needs to decide the
matter. (3) A neutral tribunal which decides the matter based upon the
evidence presented is also essential to a fair hearing. The absence of bias and
the independence of the tribunal are prerequisites if the hearing officer's
decision is to be acceptable to the person charged. (4) A reasoneddecision is a
recent addition in many circumstances. This element usually includes the
making of findings and the giving of reasons in support of the conclusion
reached. It assures that the institution's articulated standards have been applied
uniformly, and it provides visible evidence of the integrity of the decisionmaking process. Though not required to do so, educational institutions have added
a fifth feature, and that is the opportunity for review of an adverse decision by
a superior official. 32 This is a further safety check. No process can assure
complete accuracy or avoid all mistakes. It also recognizes the common fact
that those on a lower rung of authority often impose relatively harsh remedies.
And while superior officers seldom reverse unfavorable decisions, they frequently adjust the penalties downward.
30. See, e.g., Arizona State Univ. College of Law, Statement of Policies (1977-78), 12-14, on file
at Arizona State Law Journal.

31. See, e.g., Office of the Dean of Students, Arizona State Univ., Policies and Procedures
§ Ill(B), at 12-16 (1977), on file at Arizona State Law Journal.
32. See, e.g., id., § Ill(D), at 18-19.
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These or similar procedures, then, are now followed in student (and employee) disciplinary proceedings where fact issues predominate. Similar but
less formalized procedures also often govern questions of residence which
determine whether in-state/out-of-state quotas and tuition apply. But other
important decisions in which such procedures might seem applicable-such as
student admissions, faculty hiring, and promotion-also involve matters of
subjective judgment. It is generally impossible to reduce such decisions to the
precise criteria that would make trial-type procedures workable, and the need
to permit candid statements of opinion or to protect ongoing relationships may
argue in favor of a broader measure of administrative discretion and flexibility.
Thus, while some procedural formality and participatory rights have evolved,
compromises have been required. Still, the change from the very recent past is
startling." Current procedures generally seem much fairer to the individual and
also provide greater assurance to the university that an accurate yet rigorous
judgment has been made. Obviously much more faculty and administrative
time and effort are consumed by a systematic review of, for instance, a faculty
promotion decision. This is not necessarily at greater "cost" to the university,
however, if the overall quality of such decisions is improved thereby.
A review of admissions decisions, especially of the professional schools
facing enrollment pressures, would reveal a less formalized procedure but a
similar and significant change in process. On the other hand, other areas of
discretion-student placement and references, grades and academic honors,
33. Consider, for example, the matter of faculty promotion and tenure. Not long ago, in institutional terms, the process was extremely rudimentary in many universities. The matter was not
mentioned in advance, no resume or list of writings was sought, and no interview occurred.
Indeed, the candidate was often wholly unaware that the faculty was even considering the
matter. And the faculty apparently considered the matter without a committee report, close
consideration of teaching performance, or even a reading of the candidate's scholarship.
Now compare the process as it is developing at both Arizona State University and the State
University of New York at Buffalo today. Each year every probationary candidate's activities
are evaluated by a college committee and summarized for the dean; individual discussions are
held with the candidate to review his progress. Specific standards on the measure of performance must be met. At the time the primary decision is to be made, the candidate usually
prepares a memorandum outlining his teaching responsibilities, writing and other scholarly
activities, university and community service, and so forth. The committee then reviews his
writings, attends classes, often interviews students, sometimes communicates with scholars in
his field, reads student evaluations, and considers other evidence. The candidate may submit
any evidence he wishes and even seek an interview. An open hearing is not held, however,
because it is believed that the need for candor and the necessity for maintaining an ongoing
relationship with the candidate are overriding requirements. Participation by close colleagues
in the process is apparently viewed as an adequate substitute. The committee then submits its
recommendations to the faculty. If an adverse recommendation is made, the candidate may be
given an opportunity to respond; usually, however, a supporting colleague makes the case for
him. The faculty is also provided with a copy of the candidate's resume and urged to read his
writings. The matter is then considered de novo. This process continues with separate review
by the dean and a university-wide committee with, in some instances, an opportunity to
respond to an adverse recommendation along the way. See generally Arizona State Univ.,
Faculty Handbook § 3.5.6, at 42-43 (rev. ed. 1977), on file at Arizona State Law Journal.
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teaching loads and salaries, to name a few-usually have not been affected,
beyond the relatively minor changes that faculty unions have gained in bargaining. Although it may seem heresy for two deans to make this statement, it does
seem to us that further changes, similar to those which occurred in faculty
promotion and tenure, will occur here and in other areas. That is to say, deans
and department chairmen now check with faculty on teaching assignments and
loads before decisions are made, and decisions on leaves and sabbaticals are no
longer solely matters of administrative grace. Nevertheless, additional
concerns may limit future changes in faculty participation. Self-interest, for
example, may skew faculty judgments on such matters as salaries and layoffs.
If excellence is to be a university's standard, then faculty input will continue to
be limited in this area. Similar reasons will, we think, preclude student
participation in the determination of grades and academic honors.
In summary, a range of procedures and standards is used by institutions of
higher education in limiting the discretion of administrators. If decisions are
heavily dependent upon facts, it is likely that trial-type requirements will be
relied upon. If non-quantifiable judgments are involved, less formalized processes will be used. University administrators do have to follow certain
procedures, imposed by courts and by universities themselves, that may include requirements of notice, hearings, reasoned decisions, and the like, with
varying degrees of formality. Yet the benefits of increased fairness and accuracy in decisionmaking generally outweigh the inconvenience and are in accord
with the goals of an institution characterized as enlightened and a leader in
reform.
III.

OPENNESS, CONFIDENTIALITY, AND CONTROLS OVER INFORMATION

Paralleling the rapid evolution of "administrative due process" has been the
even more rapid emergence of laws designed to govern the use and control of
sensitive information. At the federal level alone, legislation-has forced numerous major changes in information-management practices over the past dozen
years. Broad disclosure of government files became the rule through the
enactment and amendment of the Freedom of Information Act; 34 regulatory
agency meetings have been opened to the public under the Government in the
Sunshine Act35 and Federal Advisory Committee Act; 36 protections against
governmental abuse of sensitive personal information were provided by the
Privacy Act of 1974; 37 and minimum standards for use of consumer credit
34. Pub. L.
1561-64
35. Pub. L.
36. Pub. L.
37. Pub. L.

No. 90-23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54 (1967), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat.
(1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976)).
No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. App. (1976)).
No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976)).
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information were established by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 38 the Fair
Credit Billing Act, 39 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.4' The state legislatures have also been active, and most states have either enacted or amended
"open government" statutes during this period. The sweeping legislative
agenda that was recently recommended by the federal Privacy Protection Study
Commission4 suggests that more inclusive and more detailed informationcontrol laws may be forthcoming.
This outpouring of legislation reflects a broad-based social demand to hold
accountable large bureaucracies in both the public and private sectors. Recent
history has often illustrated that the power which flows from the creation,
collection, analysis, transfer, and disclosure of information can easily be
abused. While the requirements of "administrative due process" described
above provide some protections against arbitrariness when this power is exercised in relatively formal decisions, the information-control statutes generally
seek to extend and adapt the procedural safeguards to a wide array of less
formal, less visible, but no less important forms of bureaucratic decisionmaking.
A.

IndividualDecisions and "Privacy" of Information

These underlying concerns are evident in the federal information law that is
of most direct concern to higher education: the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act, 42 officially known by the acronym "FERPA" but more colloquially referred to as the "Buckley Amendment." This statute grew out of several
studies in the early 1970's which found that the recordkeeping practices of
many elementary and secondary schools failed to protect the privacy interests
of students and parents and gave them little or no voice in crucial decisions
affecting their welfare.4 3 It reflects a growing awareness that the individual's
right to control personal information should extend beyond the traditional
privacy concern with preventing public disclosure of sensitive personal data, to
include the power to assure that the information is accurate, timely, complete,
and used for a proper purpose. Although institutions of higher education were
38. Pub. L. No. 91-508, Title VI, § 601, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t
(1970)).
39. Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title 111, 88 Stat. 1511 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1666-1666j (Supp. IV
1974)).
40. Pub. L. No. 93-495, Title V, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e (Supp. IV
1974)).
41. See THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1977).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (Supp. V 1975).
43.

See generally THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 411-13; Note,

The Buckley Amendment: Opening School Files for Student and Parental Review, 24 CATH.
U.L. REV. 588, 594 n.38 (1975).
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included in FERPA almost as an afterthought, it seems clear that the colleges
and universities have at least as much power as the lower schools, and often
more, to shape the individual student's future by the records they keep. In a
competitive, credential-conscious society, "keeping a clean record," "building a resume," and collecting faculty recommendations are the common
prerequisites for obtaining admission to desired programs, receiving scholarship assistance, and finding employment. Most institutions of higher education
have been careful in exercising the powers that their recordkeeping functions
confer, but they are not immune to mistake, bad judgment, sloppiness, or even
malice in processing student records.
In retrospect some abuses of these recordkeeping powers now seem extraordinary, as in the case of the 1966 decision by administrators at the University
of Michigan to release the membership records of several student political
organizations to the House Un-American Activities Committee without notifying the students or giving them an opportunity to argue against disclosure."
Although the political climate has become less volatile in recent years, problems of government access to student records still arise.45
To limit this potential for harm, FERPA and other contemporary "privacy"
laws regard the collection, use, and dissemination of student records as a series
of decisions-informal adjudications-that in practice will shape the individual's future. From this perspective it follows that the student should be
provided the fundamentals of a fair procedure: notice, an opportunity to find
out whether there is potentially damaging or inaccurate information in the file,
and a chance to dispute or explain harmful items of information. In addition,
since university records typically contain sensitive private information about a
student's personal finances, academic performance, and physical, emotional or
disciplinary problems, the individual student is given a voice in determining
whether the information will be used or disclosed for purposes other than those
for which it was originally collected.
Although these requirements are relatively mild, and the regulations implementing the statute permit the universities considerable flexibility in meeting
FERPA's objectives, the Act has met strong resistance from the academic
community. In essence, the principal objections are twofold: It is claimed that
the required procedures are unduly costly to financially hard-pressed institutions, and that student access rights will impair the quality and accuracy of
44. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1966, at 20, col. 4.
45. The Veterans Administration, for example, recently obtained access to some universities' files
in order to compare the performance of students who were receiving VA assistance with the
performance of students who were not. Again, student consent was not requested. THE
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 409.
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decisions, primarily by reducing the candor of recommendation letters and
other judgmental evaluations. At present, there has not been enough experience under FERPA to permit a conclusive testing of these arguments. The
evidence that is available, however, suggests that neither the cost objection nor
the candor complaint has much substance.
First, in considering administrative burdens and costs, one should keep in
mind that the early transition period-when regulated institutions are changing
their practices to comply with a new statute-is likely to be the time of greatest
expense and disruption. Yet, when the Privacy Protection Study Commission
sought data regarding these early costs of compliance, it found no substantial
evidence that the burdens imposed by FERPA were as severe as the critics
claimed. 6 In retrospect, it is perhaps not surprising that the burden feared by
FERPA's critics failed to materialize. Even before FERPA, state statutes and
judicial decisions had created some student access rights in approximately half
of the states, 47 and as a result some institutions may have already developed the
required procedures. In any event, FERPA does little more than prescribe good
recordkeeping practices and minimum standards of fairness in dealing with
student files. Any college or university that did experience severe disruption in
adjusting to FERPA's requirements probably had inadequate or slipshod record
management systems and should benefit from rationalizing its practices to
comply with the statute.
The second standard objection, that recommendation letters will become
bland and uninformative if they can be seen by the students who requested
them, is more difficult to evaluate. At the outset, there is a real question
whether, as a practical matter, student access to recommendations has been
significantly expanded by FERPA. The right to inspect recommendation letters
may be waived, and few students are likely to risk the displeasure of the letterwriter by refusing to waive access rights. 4 8 But even if it could be shown that
student access would "chill the candor" of recommendation letters, it is
46.

In response to the Commission's direct request for data on the cost of implementing
FERPA, only one institution produced evidence of extra expenditures. Its estimate,
after careful analysis, was that FERPA cost about one extra dollar per year per
student and, in doing the analysis, it discovered several places in which the flexibility
FERPA allows would enable it to cut even that cost without detriment to the
individual student. Had the cost of implementing FERPA been as great as the
rhetoric would suggest, the Commission's request for data would surely have produced budgeting and planning documents reflecting the costs from institutions that
had found them to be burdensome. While there are obviously some costs incurred in
implementing the law-an extra page or two of printing, an extra form for those who
wish directory information withheld, and the cost of discussions with faculty, staff,
and administrators-it seems safe to infer that they are insignificant.
Id. at 418 (footnote omitted).
47. See Cudlipp, The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Two Years Later, II U. RICH.
L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1976).
48. See THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 424.
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doubtful that this would be a great loss. As anyone knows who has written or
read a substantial number of student recommendation letters, they are a
notoriously "soft" and unreliable source of information. If FERPA forces
admissions officers and employers to use more objective data in making their
decisions, the fairness and quality of these decisions should be improved rather
than harmed.
The early implementation of FERPA has been neither vigorous nor uniform;
nevertheless, there are indications that it is having some beneficial effects. The
Act reportedly has caused some institutions to clean out stale or unnecessary
files and has provided administrators with a basis 'for refusing to hand over
student files routinely to law enforcement agencies.4 9 Beyond its practical
impact, FERPA also suggests a positive symbolic or psychological change in
the role of the individual confronting the educational bureaucracy. Instead of
being viewed as a "data subject" whose file can be processed, manipulated,
and disclosed at will, the student is restored to the status of a unique person
who has enforceable rights to control the uses of particular information that
relates to him.
B.

Policy Decisions and Openness

While "privacy" statutes like FERPA are designed to assure fairness in the
institution's treatment of the individual, the open records and open meetings
laws speak primarily to the collective rights of affected groups to monitor and
participate in the formulation of institutional policy. In this area, the compulsion of laws or regulations may be less significant to the universities than the
general climate of opinion that the laws reflect. Although some public universities may be covered by general state freedom of information or "sunshine"
laws, 5 0 the movement toward open decisionmaking in the academic world
came largely in response to the demands of students and other internal
constituencies in the late 1960's and early 1970's. The rationale for greater
disclosure and participatory rights is familiar by now: Openness deters or
exposes abuses, brings relevant facts and points of view to the surface before
decisions become final, and makes decisions more acceptable to persons and
groups who have been given an opportunity to participate in the formulation of
policy.
In this area, as in the privacy debates, the argument has been made that full
disclosure "chills candor" and inhibits frank discussion. Whatever force this
49. Cudlipp, supra note 47, at 39.
50. See generally Shurtz, The Universityin the Sunshine:Application of the Open Meeting Laws to
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argument may have in other contexts, it is unpersuasive when applied to most
faculty deliberations. Indeed, some positive benefits may be realized if the
prospect of an open meeting forces participants to "do their homework,"
rather than rambling on extemporaneously, and dampens rhetorical excesses in
favor of more realistic problem-solving efforts.
The question of how openness affects governance of universities and other
large institutions is, of course, a good deal more complicated than this.
Observers of the many conflicts over access to the meetings and records of the
federal bureaucracies have begun to examine more closely the manner in which
openness can alter the dynamics of group decisionmaking. Some of these
commentators have concluded that full disclosure damages the processes by
which conflict is mediated and compromise generated, 5 while others have
asserted that widespread participation tends to perpetuate the status quo by
giving more interest groups an effective veto over proposed actions.5 2 The
federal experience also suggests that the aggregate costs of a full disclosure
policy can be overwhelming, at least when the institution in question is not
trusted by large numbers of the concerned public. 5 3 Implementation of the new
information laws is also bringing to the surface the implicit tension between the
collective accountability objectives of the openness laws and the individual
accountability goals of the privacy statutes. Information that may be useful in
monitoring the organization's performance could also be harmful to particular
individuals if disclosed to the public, and finding an acceptable balance
between the conflicting interests of openness and confidentiality is often a
difficult task.
In short, the process of implementing, understanding, and refining the recent
information-control statutes is still at a relatively early stage. As is often true of
major new legislative programs, both the benefits and the costs of change have
sometimes been oversold. But underlying the exaggerated claims and criticisms is an important, unfinished social effort to find better means of controlling and humanizing large bureaucratic organizations, including the bureaucracies of higher education.
the University Setting, 5 J.L. & EDUC. 453 (1976).
See Perritt & Wilkinson, Open Advisory Committees and the PoliticalProcess: The Federal
Advisory Committee Act After Two Years, 63 GEO. L.J. 725, 739-42 (1975).
52. See Cleveland, How Do You Get Everybody In on the Act and Still Get Some Action, reprinted
in 120 CONG. REC. § 19, at 455-57 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1974).
53. The United States Department of Justice, parent agency of the FBI, spent more than half a
million man-hours responding to requests for information in 1976, and at one point the
agency's backlog in processing requests extended for several years. AcCESs REPORTS, April 5,
1977, at 6-7. See also Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605
(D.C. Cir. 1976).
51.
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IV.

RULES, REPORTS, AND SANCTIONS

While due process and open government are important aspects of the
university's changing relationship with its internal constituencies, the issue of
how universities relate to external governmental influences-particularly those
bureaucracies which fund and regulate higher education-is a more pressing
concern in the minds of most administrators.
To an increasing extent, the regulatory programs that seek to change university practices are enforced through administrative rules, reporting requirements, and sanctions. Requirements for affirmative action in hiring, prohibitions on sex and age discrimination, occupational safety standards, and the
recent regulations on fair treatment of the handicapped all exemplify regulatory
programs which operate through a broad delegation of authority to an administrative agency, which then has the responsibility for formulating detailed
implementing rules.
In considering the effects of these regulatory programs on the universities,
one must be aware of the differences between the formal paradigm of administratively imposed rules, reporting requirements, and sanctions, and the informal processes of bargaining, mediation, and mutual adjustment that give life to
the formal model. Much of the hostile reaction among academicians to the
process of administrative regulation seems to be directed toward the formal
model, which is perceived as a system of inflexible rules imposed by rigid,
unresponsive bureaucracies, and backed by devastating sanctions. Such a
limited view of the regulatory process may be not only distorted, but also selfdefeating. Most regulatory bureaucracies can be moved, but only by those who
push hard and in the right places. Knowing where and how to "push" requires
an appreciation of both the formal and the informal procedural tools that are
available to the university as a regulated industry.
A.

Rulemaking

The issuance of an administrative rule typically follows an extended period
of development, during which interested persons have had opportunities to
affect the content of the formal rule. Even in its simplest, most discretionary
form, administrative rulemaking usually provides affected interests with the
rudiments of fair procedure. At a minimum, they will be given notice and an
opportunity to submit written comments on the proposed rules. In many
instances, the agency is required by statute to recognize considerably more
elaborate procedural rights, including formal hearings with the opportunity to
cross-examine, and to provide a detailed justification for the rule on the basis
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of the record it has compiled.5 4 Judicial review is commonly available before
the rule is enforced, and reviewing courts have been increasingly willing in
recent years to probe in depth the factual, legal, and policy bases of administra55
tive rules.
Beneath this formal superstructure, there is often an informal process of
information-exchange and negotiation between the agency and interested parties. 56 Pre-publication negotiations are a common feature of the rulemaking
process because they can be beneficial to both the regulators and the regulated.
The agency typically knows less about the operations of the regulated industry
and the possible consequences of the rule than industry members do; and most
bureaucrats have an aversion to surprises, especially those which may bring
public or political criticism. For the regulated parties, informal give-and-take
with agency representatives provides an opportunity to shape the agency's
thinking before positions have solidified.
The effectiveness of the regulated university at the informal levels of
decisionmaking may depend in large measure on its willingness and ability to
use the more formal procedural rights that are available to it. In most fields of
economic regulation, government agencies have learned the hard way that a
failure to respond to legitimate objections from the regulated industry can lead
to bitter, protracted hearings at the agency level and judicial reversals of the
rules that are finally issued. The academic community has seemed reluctant to
resort to formal procedures and lawsuits, and as a result may have less leverage
in the informal stages of rulemaking than it could have. However, this condi54. For a discussion of the various forms of administrative rulemaking procedures in the federal
system, see Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The
Need for Procedural Innovationin AdministrativeRulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1277 (1972).

55. See generally B.

SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 204 (1976).

56. An example of informal contacts affecting agency rulemaking is provided by the following
description of the drafting of affirmative action rules in 1972:
[A]t the end of July 1972 a 100-page draft of guidelines for the application of the
Executive orders . . . to institutions of higher education was prepared [by the U.S.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare] and sent to some two dozen university officials for their personal review and their comment by mid-August, as it was
hoped that a guidelines document could be published by the opening of the academic
year in September.
Some of the university officials who received the document presented to the
appropriate officials in the Department of Labor their strong objections to parts of
the HEW draft. The Director of Federal Contract Compliance in the Department of
Labor has to approve any regulations [of this nature] ....
The Department of Labor officials, recognizing that the 100-page draft was unnecessarily detailed, ambiguous, and intrusive, instructed HEW to develop a new
draft cut down perhaps to one-third the size, tightly organized and objectively
written. ...
• . . HEW issued its guidelines in October 1972. For the most part, these
guidelines follow the specifications stated by the Department of Labor.
Lester, Antibias Regulation of Universities, reprinted in Hearings on Federal Higher Education ProgramsInstitutionalEligibility, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2B, 1006, 1072-73 (1974).
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tion may be changing as the regulatory process becomes more familiar and
pervasive in higher education.
B.

Reporting Requirements

When the regulatory process shifts from rulemaking to the enforcement
phase, another set of dynamics comes into play. Many contemporary regulatory systems, including the major federal programs affecting higher education,
rely heavily on reporting requirements which empower the agency to specify
the nature and format of information that must be filed by the regulated
industry. The "utilization analyses," "goals and timetables," and other paperwork required under the affirmative action program are familiar examples
of this approach. From the government's perspective, reporting requirements
have obvious advantages over alternative enforcement strategies, such as
waiting for complainants to report violations or sending out investigators to
examine the activities of particular institutions. Regular reports can provide a
detailed, systematic view, extended over time, of the compliance activities of
the regulated industry and identify targets for more intensive enforcement
activities. Self-reporting can also provide more accurate information, at less
total cost, than having government investigators who are unfamiliar with the
institution collect the data. And, perhaps most important of all, reporting
requirements can shift a large part of the costs of compliance from government
to the regulated industry. Of course, the cost-shifting feature is the reason why
reporting requirements often are distasteful and burdensome to the regulated
industry, and as a result these provisions are a frequent point of conflict in
57
administrative regulation.
The formal legal system generally confers broad information-gathering power on the administrative agency. The statutes permit considerable discretion in
prescribing the content and timing of reports and in obtaining access to records.
The person or organization that is ordered to report may be able to get some
58
form of court review, but the scope of this review tends to be quite limited.
57. The issue whether the universities or the regulators should bear these costs is a complex one,
involving questions of the magnitude of the cost burden, where it will finally come to rest, and
what the consequences of the burden will be upon those who must bear it. It is easy to imagine
extreme situations in which allocation of all compliance costs to either the regulators or the
regulated would have unfortunate effects. For example, if the regulatory requirements impose
major costs on the universities and these costs are passed on to students in the form of

substantial tuition increases, the net result could be reduced educational opportunities for low
and moderate income students. On the other hand, forcing the regulatory agency to bear all
expenses out of its appropriation could totally frustrate implementation of a desirable program. Without better data concerning the nature and distribution of compliance costs, there is
little basis for choosing among these and other plausible arguments relating to cost-shifting.
58. Compare B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 48 (1976) (administrative agencies have broad
powers to require reports and issue subpoenas to assure compliance with statutes and
regulations) with note 55 supra and accompanying text.
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At the informal level, however, the realities are somewhat different. Even if a
court battle over reporting requirements is won by the agency, the delays and
other costs associated with litigation can slow or cripple an enforcement
program. Moreover, the agencies are accountable not only to the courts, but
also to legislatures and executive officials, and these political overseers are
often very responsive to the regulated industry's claims that they are being
subjected to an unnecessary paperwork burden. On the other hand, the regulated cannot be too intransigent, since resistance creates costs and risks,
including the loss of goodwill and support that can result from seeming to be an
opponent of the underlying goals that the regulatory program fosters. Few
university administrators, for example, want to appear hostile to the ideal of
equal opportunity for minorities, women, or the handicapped-a reputation
that might well follow from vociferous opposition to reporting requirements.
When these conflicting pressures exist, neither the regulators nor the regulated can escalate the conflict without risk to themselves. Often, both sides
give a little, and a compromise set of reporting requirements is worked out.
This is probably already happening in the administration of reporting requirements applicable to the universities. While educators have been complaining
about the stifling paperwork burden associated with federal programs such as
affirmative action, civil rights advocates have sharply criticized the Higher
Education Division of HEW's Office for Civil Rights on the ground that it has
failed to impose on the universities reporting requirements which are compara59
ble to those demanded of other federal contractors.
Even when the agencies are willing to compromise on reporting requirements, there remains a considerable (if poorly documented) cost burden for the
universities to absorb." Part of this burden may result from overlapping,
piecemeal regulatory programs which are administered by different agencies,
or different subunits of the same agency, sometimes inconsistently. 6' At the
same time, many academic observers suspect that the mandatory reports ask
for information that is irrelevant or misleading, and that the quantities of data
demanded cannot even be digested by the regulators.62
59. See, e.g.,

UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, Vol. III, at 275-281, 269 (1975).

60. Whether the universities should continue to absorb these costs, even if unnecessary expenses
can be minimized, is, of course, a separate issue. See note 57 supra.
61. See, e.g., Vetter, Affirmative Action in Faculty Employment Under Executive Order 11246,
printed in Hearings on Federal Higher Education Programs Institutional Eligibility, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2A, 357, 368-75 (1974).
62. See generally Lester, supra note 56. See also the assertion of President Robben Fleming of the

University of Michigan:
[T]he cost and effort [of compiling information] might be justified if it could be
demonstrated that it is productive. On the contrary, it is evident that enforcement
agencies are not staffed to examine and analyze the mountains of material which they
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While these problems are real, they are not incurable. In large measure they
can be traced to conditions such as understaffing in the regulatory agency and
the unfamiliarity of enforcement officials with the operations and mores of the
university. In the affirmative action program, another aggravating factor has
been the use of a set of reporting requirements which had been developed to
deal with hiring practices in industrial enterprises, and which therefore often
did not fit the rather different recruitment and employment practices found in
higher education. Given the inherent flexibility of the administrative process, it
should be possible to work out satisfactory solutions for many of these problems in the reporting requirements, if the regulated seize their opportunities to
influence the regulators.
C. Enforcement Actions
The final stage in this paradigm of the regulatory process is enforcement
against those who have violated the rules. When formal accusations are made
against a member of the regulated industry and sanctions are threatened, the
full spectrum of due process rights to notice and a fair hearing generally comes
into play, and judicial review is usually available if the accused is found
"guilty" at the administrative level. Perhaps the most significant feature of the
formal sanctioning process, however, is the fact that it is rarely used in many
regulatory programs. This seems especially true when sanctions involve the
termination of large-scale federal funding arrangements, a situation which
encompasses many of the regulatory programs affecting higher education.
Even the affirmative action program, which has been highly controversial since
the 1972 amendments to the regulations,6 3 has not generated a substantial
amount of formal enforcement activity. Indeed, not until 1977 were reports
published describing the first formal enforcement proceeding against a university for violation of the Executive Order, and even then the administrative
decision was not final. 64 Minority and women's rights advocates have complained bitterly about HEW's tendency to negotiate with the universities over
compliance rather than bringing formal enforcement actions, 65 and at times
are accumulating. Unless the whole procedure is a form of punishment . . . it is hard
to see what really useful purpose it is serving.
Hearings on Federal Higher Education Programs Institutional Eligibility, supra note 61, at
93-94.
63. 36 Fed.Reg. 23,152 (1971) (codified at 41 C.F.R. Chapter 60, part 60-2 (1977), and commonly
known as Revised Order No. 4).
64. See U. of Texas Faces Loss ofFederal Contracts, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Feb. 22,
1977, at 11, col. I.
65. See, e.g., Hearings on Federal Higher Education Programs Institutional Eligibility, supra
note 61, at 326 (prepared statement of Mordeca Jane Pollock, Employment Compliance Task
Force, National Organization for Women) ("HEW has repeatedly neglected to initiate enforcement proceedings when it has found violations by colleges and universities . ...
Instead, it has routinely elected to pursue protracted negotiations, which sometimes last
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they have resorted to lawsuits against the agency in an effort to compel more
66
vigorous enforcement of equal opportunity rules.
The reasons behind the agencies' reluctance to employ the formal sanctioning apparatus can be found in the sanctions themselves. When the principal or
only sanction is a total termination of federal funding, or a flat ban on future
grants and contracts, the sanctions may actually be too devastating to use. A
funding cutoff could threaten the survival of even a major university, could
harm innocent students and faculty who were not responsible for the violation,
and could prevent the government from procuring needed products or services
from the offending institution. These sweeping sanctions are, as one knowledgeable observer put it, "clumsy and overpotent, "67 and it is small wonder
that the regulators will not lightly invoke them. By the same token, many
university administrators may regard any possibility of a federal fund cutoff,
however slight, as a risk they cannot accept.
These incentives to avoid formal proceedings doubtless tend to compel
bargaining and a search for compromise solutions, but they may also generate
some needless friction and cynicism in all parties involved. Enforcement
officials may feel that there is no credible response they can make to violations
that do not merit the severest sanctions; educators may feel that they are
powerless to resist the demands of enforcement officials even when the university can make a relatively strong case for its position; and the intended
beneficiaries of the regulatory program may feel that enforcement is a sham
because the statutory sanctions are never imposed. A more realistic range of
flexible sanctions could improve relationships among the agencies and the
universities, and provide a more structured context for the processes of negotiation and compromise.
The general outline of the regulatory process that emerges is a system in
which change often takes place incrementally through bargaining and compromise, beneath a formal structure of legal and administrative procedures. Living
in this sort of environment may be uncomfortable for many educators. By
training and temperament, academicians tend to prefer clarity to ambiguity,
and prefer principled, reasoned decisions to bargained or compromised outcomes. 68 But adapting to a system of regulation does not inevitably result in a
several years, and which ultimately lead to no relief for victims of discrimination."). See also
id. at 73 (statement of Peter E. Holmes, Director, Office for Civil Rights, Department of
Health, Education & Welfare).
66. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed in THE FEDERAL CIVIL
RIOHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT--1974, supra note 59, at 256-64.

67. Vetter, supra note 61, at 359.
68. A classic articulation of this perspective is found in the chapter entitled Liberal Jurisprudence
in T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 125-56 (1969).
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surrender to raw pragmatism, unrelieved by any aspiration or fidelity to higher
values. Regulation of higher education, like most other fields of public administration, involves efforts to reconcile in particular settings the conflicts among
important, widely-shared values, such as academic freedom and equality of
opportunity, fairness to the individual and educational quality. If these goals
are kept in sight, a process which leaves room for negotiation and accommodation among contending interests may be the surest method of producing social
change.
V.

CONCLUSION

As the influence of regulatory procedures, programs, and techniques spreads
throughout higher education, there will be fundamental changes not only in the
way the university interacts with the outside world, but also in the way it
governs itself internally. University administrators will increasingly come into
direct contact with the various regulatory bureaucracies. Dealing effectively
with this new set of external constituencies will require further development of
capacities and skills that most administrators already possess in some degree.
Perhaps most important is sensitivity to changing social needs and demands.
Regulatory intervention is likely to be most intrusive and disruptive when
the institution being regulated has failed to adapt to the evolving concerns of
the society. Administrators also should develop a more sophisticated understanding of the workings of the regulatory process, including the various
procedural tools and techniques that can be used to affect agency decisions.
And they must be willing to use these tools in appropriate circumstances-to
bargain hard when there is room for reasonable accommodation and to resort to
the courts when litigation is necessary.
The regulatory presence is likely to be felt not only in more frequent contacts
between university administrators and government regulators, but also in the
evolving relationship between the universities and intermediary organizations
like the American Council on Education (ACE). In many areas of economic
regulation, the enactment of regulatory programs has resulted in increased
powers and responsibilities among the trade or professional associations which
represent the collective interests of the regulated industry. 69 This often happens
because a single, central association can develop influence and resources that
69. This is not to suggest that there is a simple, universal pattern in which trade associations arise
and gain power in response to the stimulus of government regulation. As Gabriel Kolko has
pointed out, existing industry groups may actively seek government regulation as a means of
achieving their own purposes, and government may try to use or co-opt voluntary associations
as a means of implementing state policy. See generally G. KOLKO, MAIN CURRENTS IN
MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 107-43 (1976). Significant for present purposes are the advantages of the voluntary association in responding to the regulatory environment.
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its dispersed members will rarely be able to match. With a full-time,
specialized staff, the association can master the intricacies of regulatory programs more completely than the administrator or manager who devotes only
part of his attention to the task. It can also bring together reliable information
about general trends and conditions within the sector of the economy it
represents, and its position as a general spokesman of the industry gives the
association's views more weight and authority. Through continuous monitoring of the regulatory bureaucracies, a central association often gains the
important advantages of access and timing: It can reach the key decisionmakers
with data and argument at a time when regulatory policy is still in flux and
amenable to change. In short, the greater economy and effectiveness of central
representation often lead the regulated parties to delegate the principal responsibility for protecting their interests in the regulatory process to the association.7 0
If intermediary organizations, such as ACE, do assume an enhanced role as
spokesmen for the concerns of university administrations, there may be significant changes in the individual universities' relationships to these associations.
One possible consequence is increasing pressure for member institutions to
support the position advocated by the association: A dissident university may
find itself in the doubly disadvantageous position of not only having to
represent itself without the resources and expertise of the association, but also
having to argue against the weight and authority of an establishment viewpoint.
The associations, by virtue of their specialized knowledge and their strategic
position between government and academe, may also take a more active role in
shaping collective policy positions, rather than simply reflecting the desires of
their constituents .71 If the power and influence of the associations do grow in
70. There are already some signs that higher education is following the patterns set by the
regulated industries in their dealings with government agencies. ACE and the more specialized
professional and academic associations are becoming more effective participants in the
regulatory process, and the Chronicle of Higher Education now covers government regulatory
stories as intensively as many industry trade journals do. Moreover, the "capture" of
administrative agencies by the regulated industry seems to be well advanced in the field of
higher education. Two university chancellors were appointed recently to the ranking positions
dealing with higher education in the federal bureaucracy, Assistant Secretary for Education of
the Department of HEW and U.S. Commissioner of Education. See Roark, Washington's
Week: New Faces In, Chronicle of Higher Education, Jan. 24, 1977, at 1, col. 3. At about the
same time, a congressional report criticized the Federal Advisory Committee for Higher
Educational Equal Employment Opportunity Programs on the grounds that it was dominated
by university administrators, and tended to make recommendations that weakened the enforcement of equal opportunity laws. See Fields, House Unit Urges Single Anti-Bias Authority, Chronicle of Higher Education, Feb. 22, 1977, at 11, col. 1. Finally, higher education
spokesmen have recorded notable lobbying victories, such as the congressional amendment of
FERPA only one month after the original "Buckley Amendment" went into effect. See
Comment, The Buckley Amendment: Opening School Files for Student and Parental Review,
24 CATH. U.L. REV. 588, 588-89 (1975).
71. Cf. L. DEXTER, How ORGANIZATIONS ARE REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON 103 (1969) (emphasis
omitted):

1977:569]

GO VERNMENT REGULATION

this fashion, the universities may find themselves much more deeply involved
in questions of who will lead these organizations, and what policies and
priorities they should adopt.
Increasing contact with the regulatory process may also bring changes in the
internal governance of the universities. The twin pressures for increased
procedural fairness to internal constituencies and greater accountability to
outside regulators should continue to expand the administrative workload,
requiring more administrators and inflating the costs of administration. Internal
administrative stresses may be magnified as universities juggle personnel and
organizational structures to meet these increased demands. Efforts to shift
some of these costs back to the regulatory bodies that are imposing procedural
requirements also seem likely to increase. The recent disputes over the adequacy of government reimbursement of indirect costs to universities receiving
research grants may well be just the preliminary round in an extended struggle
over who will ultimately bear the burdens of regulation.
As the administrative work of the universities grows in size and complexity,
there may also be changes in the kinds of people who are involved in academic
administration. In this emerging regulatory environment, faculty members who
have specialized in the humanities or the hard sciences may find it increasingly
difficult to move into administration; by contrast, teachers who have trained in
fields related to administration-management, law, policy studies, and the
like-may have a relative advantage. Ultimately, as a result of the continuing
pressures of specialization and workload, much of the work of academic
administration may be delegated to individuals who are making a career in the
field and who have only minimal direct involvement in the teaching and
research missions of the university.
If this trend does materialize, it can have a high potential for conflict within
the universities. In any large bureaucracy, tension often arises between "line"
and "staff" personnel; in the university these tensions may be enhanced by the
unremitting hostility that many faculty members feel toward anything that even
faintly resembles regimentation or bureaucratic red tape. The university administrators, who speak the same language as the external regulators and
accept at least some of their demands as legitimate, may become a lightening
rod for faculty members' distrust and contempt for the modern bureaucratic
state.
Many clients and employers do not like, naturally enough, the idea that people
whom they have hired are guiding and educating them. Nevertheless, a good many
clients are educated or guided . . ..
• . . The most important service of Washington representatives to clients and
employers is teaching the latter to live with the government and in the society. That
is, Washington representatives instruct a good many clients how to adapt, accommodate, and adjust.
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In its extreme form, this distrust can breed conspiracy theories which hold
that swarms of petty officials inside and outside the universities are plotting to
subvert academic values. 72 A more moderate variant of this perspective sees
the university administrators as well-intentioned but misguided, incorrigible
"bureaucratic outsiders" whose overzealous efforts to save the university may
end up destroying it. In this view, adopting the bureaucratic style-devotion to
rational planning, procedural regularity and fairness, reasoned decisions and
explicit rules, efficiency, and accountability-"does not serve to insulate the
University from outside pressures to control it; rather, it cuts channels to
73
transmit those pressures inward."
Explicit in these critiques, and implicit in others, are questions not only
about who will control higher education, or how control will be exercised, but
also about the ends that will be sought by those using the various regulatory
techniques and processes. Bureaucracy and its procedures are tools which can
be used wisely or poorly, in the service of many purposes. If used sensitively,
administrative procedures can harness the collective energies of large organizations to achieve desired goals effectively, responsibly, and humanely. But
procedures can become ends in themselves, a repressive or stultifying force, if
they are not kept subordinate to primary values. Experience suggests that the
organization or institution which lacks a clearly defined, widely shared sense
of mission or identity is most vulnerable to strangulation by red tape; and it
may be that much of the anguished reaction to government regulation springs
from deep-seated doubts that the universities really have this shared sense of
mission.
In recent decades, the traditional ideal of the university as a collegium of
72. A Carnegie Commission study of federal anti-bias regulation at times comes close to this
extreme:
. . . HEW enforcement officers in some regions seek to make numerical goals and
timetables by department or "hiring unit" a key element in affirmative action programs, including for faculty . . . . The authority structure they tend to favor
conflicts with the collegial or faculty system of shared responsibility in decision
making by mature teacher-scholars. The HEW enforcement officers, interested in
certain results more than in procedures to assure the best professional judgments,
seem desirous of enhancing the authority of a university's newly appointed equal
employment opportunity officers and coordinators, who, for the most part, have not
been drawn from the faculty . ...
[T]hrough their power to approve or disaprove affirmative action plans, HEW
enforcement officials are, either consciously or unconsciously, attempting to alter
the structure of authority and governance in universities in line with the industrial
model . . . . In doing so, they are tending to undermine faculty self-government
Lester, supra note 56, at 1118-19.
73. The language is taken, admittedly somewhat out of context, from a dialogue concerning a draft
academic plan for the State University of New York at Buffalo. SUNYAB Reporter, Jan. 13,
1977, at 8, cols. 1-2. However, the statement from which the quotations come seems to reflect
a broad, underlying suspicion of bureaucratic approaches to the governance of universities. In
this respect it probably exemplifies the attitude of many who are involved in higher education.
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interacting scholars and students dedicated to a common core of academic
values, and sharing a common language of discourse, has seemed increasingly
remote and unattainable. To some observers, centripetal pressures-narrow
disciplinary specialization, the demands and inducements of outside funding
sources, the pull of instrumental and vocational interests-have tended to
transform the university into a "multiversity," a place which in Clark Kerr's
description 74 often appears to be no more than "a mechanism held together by
administrative rules and powered by money."
These critiques can be faulted for romanticizing the past and overstating the
present crisis, but they nevertheless raise serious questions that go to the heart
of the evolving relationship between government and higher education. If, as
we believe, the colleges and universities can succeed in articulating to themselves and their constituencies the goals, values, and functions that are fundamentally important to their role in contemporary society, then the increasing
interactions with the regulatory process may be as much an opportunity as a
threat. But it is essential to approach this task in the right spirit-to avoid what
Gerald Grant and David Reisman have called "fantasies of omnipotence" and
"fantasies of total powerlessness" while trying to discover "what kinds of
human quality can be nurtured in a college setting which can support the
rationality necessary for a technological order along with, rather than in
75
antagonism to, the more contemplative and expressive values."

74. C. KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 20 (paper ed. 1972).
75. Grant & Reisman, An Ecology of Academic Reform, 104 DAEDALUS 166, 185-86 (1975).

